Two claims you don't have to take on faith. Both were checked by an independent reviewer using read-only calls against Base mainnet. Here is what they found, and how to reverify it yourself.
Most projects claim their liquidity is locked. Almost none let you check. These two facts are the whole point of "Unrugable," and they survive a hostile audit:
1. The liquidity cannot be pulled — the withdrawal code does not exist.
2. Tokens sent to the burn address can never move again — proven two independent ways.
This page is factual, not promotional. Nothing here is investment advice, no return is promised, and nothing on this site is a stablecoin. See our full risk disclosure.
Every liquidity position the network created is held by a contract, not by any person's wallet. And those contracts do not contain the code needed to send a position away. An independent review decoded each reactor's positions and checked who owns them:
ReactorPrimeV3 7 pools -> all 7 held by THE REACTOR ITSELF ReactorHub 5 pools -> all 5 held by THE REACTOR ITSELF v1Prime 13 pools -> 12 held by THE REACTOR ITSELF (1 unresolved) V7 launch 2 pools -> both held by THE REACTOR ITSELF -------------------------------------------------------------- 26 of 27 positions held by contracts. ZERO held by any personal wallet. Reactor bytecode: ERC721 safeTransferFrom (0x42842e0e, 0xb88d4fde) : ABSENT decreaseLiquidity (0x0c49ccbe) : ABSENT collect (0xfc6f7865) : present (fees only)
The one position that would not resolve is marked unresolved rather than assumed. The withdrawal and liquidity-removal selectors are simply not in the bytecode, so there is no function anyone — including the admins — can call to extract the liquidity.
What the admins CAN do, and cannot do: reactor admins can pause a reactor and deregister pools. They provably cannot withdraw liquidity. The power is to stop the machine, not to take from it.
pools(i) and decode the tokenId.ownerOf(tokenId) on the Uniswap V3 position manager 0x03a520b32c04bf3beef7beb72e919cf822ed34f1 — the owner is the reactor contract, not a wallet.eth_getCode and search for the transfer/decreaseLiquidity selectors above. They are absent.All network burns go to a single address: 0xfd780B0aE569e15e514B819ecFDF46f804953a4B (Base, chain 8453). It is an OpenSea SeaDrop ERC-1155 whose implementation is immutable. It has an owner who controls metadata and royalties — and who can never move a token out, because the code to do so does not exist.
Across ~42,000 bytes of the implementation and its configurer, none of the ERC-20 movement selectors exist:
0xa9059cbb transfer ABSENT 0x23b872dd transferFrom ABSENT 0x095ea7b3 approve ABSENT 0xd505accf permit ABSENT 0xb61d27f6 execute ABSENT 0xac9650d8 multicall ABSENT No SELFDESTRUCT. No CREATE/CREATE2. No upgrade path.
Calling each move function as the contract's own owner, every one reverts:
transfer(a,u) -> revert 0x67fe1ffb UnsupportedFunctionSelector(bytes4) approve(a,u) -> revert 0x67fe1ffb execute(a,u,bytes) -> revert 0x67fe1ffb withdraw() -> revert 0x67fe1ffb multicall(bytes[]) -> revert 0x67fe1ffb
So balanceOf(burn address) for any token equals the amount permanently removed from circulation — it can never come back.
eth_getCode — it is an EIP-1167 minimal proxy pointing to a BaseScan-verified ERC1155SeaDropCloneable implementation.eth_call of transfer / approve / execute against the burn address — each reverts with UnsupportedFunctionSelector.These proofs are drawn from an independent, unsolicited review of tasern.quest conducted with read-only calls against Base mainnet — no transaction was ever sent. It also lists things we still need to improve. We publish it in full, including the criticism:
Don't trust — verify. Everything above can be confirmed independently on BaseScan with read-only calls. Contracts are unaudited; nothing here is a stablecoin, and no return is promised or guaranteed.